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  11. Introduction  
Economic theory suggests that small countries may benefit from a trade bloc, if their 
combined market power will enable them to manipulate the terms of trade in their favor. It 
was demonstrated by Kennan and Riezman (1988), Bond and Syropoulos (1996) and 
Syropoulos (2002) that a trade bloc can win a tariff war if its size is sufficiently large. 
However, international trade agreements have reduced the scope for tariff setting and the 
WTO process may eventually lead to free trade in agriculture. At the same time as global 
tariffs are expected to fall, the use of non-tariff barriers is likely to become more prevalent 
(Rabinowitcz 1999; Blandford et. al. 2003). The implementation of production subsidies is 
unlikely to be accepted by the WTO in future trade rounds. However, a properly configured 
regime of environmental, health or safety rules can have very similar trade effects, but will 
be difficult to be detected (Hungerford 1991, Sumner 2000).  
The objective of this article is to analyze the conditions under which the member countries 
of a trade bloc will gain from enlargement. Given the limited scope for conventional border 
protection, the analysis considers a game in production taxes/subsidies between trade blocs, 
rather than a tariff war. A production subsidy may capture the production effect which can 
be induced by a combination of environmental, health or safety rules. Following Johnson 
(1953), most studies analyzing retaliatory trade policies, are based on games between 
importing countries. By making use of Lerner’s (1936) symmetry theorem, this paper 
chooses a different approach by considering a game between an importing and an exporting 
country trading in a single commodity.  
The theoretical analysis is supplemented by a numerical analysis estimating the potential 
welfare gains of EU enlargement. Several empirical studies have tried to estimate the overall 
economic effect of Eastern enlargement of the EU based on multi-sector trade models 
  2(Baldwin et al. 1997, Keuschnigg et al. 2001, Kohler 2004, Nahuis 2004). Other authors 
analyzed the welfare implications of enlargement which would result from trade on 
agricultural markets, mostly based on the Common Agricultural Policy as it has been 
implemented prior to the 2003 CAP reform (Frandsen et al. 2000; Banse & Twesten 2001; 
Herok and Lotze 2001; Baldwin et al. 2004). The numerical simulation of this paper differs 
from previous studies, since it is based on a hypothetical scenario at which conventional 
border protection measures are completely abolished. Assuming that the EU and trading 
partners are merely allowed to implement optimal production taxes/subsidies, we calculate 
the national welfare effects of EU enlargement within a retaliatory setting. The analysis 
focuses on the grain market, where considerable market power exists (Paarlberg and Abbott 
1986; Abbott and Kallio 1996). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, a partial 
equilibrium model of bilateral trade between trade blocs. The following section then 
analyses the conditions for optimal production tax/subsidy rates. Section 4 analyses how the 
welfare of a trade blocs member countries’ is affected as a result of enlargement, while 
section 5 presents a numerical illustration. The article concludes with a summary of the main 
findings. 
 
2.  The model  
We choose a partial equilibrium trade model to analyze how the enlargement of a trade bloc 
affects countries’ social welfare. Consider two trade blocs, the home trade bloc (Country h) 
and the ‘rest of the world’ (Country w), trading in a single homogeneous agricultural good. 
Assume further that the home trade bloc is joined by another country (Country j) to form a 
new, enlarged trade bloc (Country h+j). Given the bipolar trade framework, enlargement of 
  3the home trade bloc necessarily reduces the size of the foreign trade bloc (Country w-j). Let 
consumers in country i (i=h,j,w) demand the quantity   of the agricultural good while 
producers supply the quantity S
i D
i at cost C . The supplied quantity   is determined by 
the domestic supply price (P
) ( i i S ) ( i i P S
i), whereas demand   is a function of the world demand 
price (P
) ( d i P D
d). We assume supply and demand curves to be well-behaved and linear, hence, 
0 > ∂ ∂ i i P S ,  0 < ∂ ∂ d i P D  and  0
2 = ∂ d P
2 2 2 ∂ = ∂ ∂ i i i D P S . Domestic supply prices differ from the world 
price, because countries can introduce a tax, defined as a specific tax (ti) or subsidy (-ti) on 
production. Neglecting transaction and transportation costs, the margin between countries’ 
supply price is solely determined by the tax/subsidy rate: 
i i d t P P + =                    ( 1 )  
After enlargement, country h and country j belong to the same trade bloc and will thereby 
implement the same tax rate (t ), leading to a single producer price within the trade bloc 
( ). If factor markets and product markets operate perfectly, supply prices equal 
marginal production costs in all countries (
j h t =
j h P P =
i i i S C P ∂ ∂ = ). Furthermore, the model is based on 
the trade equilibrium requirement of excess supply ( i i D S i X − = ) of the home country being 
equal to excess demand of the rest of the world: 
( ) ( ) j w j h X X X X − − = +                  ( 2 )  
Given these relationships, national welfare (W ) can be expressed as the sum of consumer 
surplus, producer benefit and tax revenues: 
i
i i i i i
P
d i i S t C S P dP D W
d
+ − + = ∫
∞
                ( 3 )  
After enlargement of the home trade bloc, the welfare of the two trade blocs can be written 
as: 
  4()() () ( j h h j h j h h
P
d j h j h S S t C C S S P dP D D W
d
+ + + − + + + = ∫
∞
+ )           ( 4 )  
()() () ( j w w j w j w w
P
d j w j w S S t C C S S P dP D D W
d
− + − − − + − = ∫
∞
− )           ( 5 )  
where  j j w w P S P S ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ and  d j d w P D P D ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ . 
 
3. Optimal domestic policies with and without retaliation 
We first analyze the optimal policy response of the two trade blocs. The domestically 
optimal tax rates ( ) can be obtained by setting the partial derivative of the domestic welfare 




0 = ∂ ∂ h h t W + j ,  0 = ∂ ∂ − w j w t W ). Taking this rule and applying the constraints in 
equations (1) and (2) to simplify the result, we obtain: 
() () () (
1 * * * , ,
− − + − − + = j w jd hd w h j w h h h D D t t X t t X t α α )
)
           ( 6 )  
() () () (
1 * * * , ,
− + + − − + − = j h jd wd w h j w h h w D D t t X t t X t α α            ( 7 )  
where  i i ii P S ∂ ∂ = S ,  d i id P D D ∂ ∂ =  and  id ii i D S − = α . 
Equations (6) and (7) demonstrate that the optimal policy response for a net importing home 
trade bloc ( ) would be to introduce a subsidy policy (t ), whereas the rest of 
the world would implement a tax policy (t ). Note that the optimal tax rates of equations 
(6) and (7) represent reaction functions, since the traded quantities ( ) are functions of both 
tax rates. The Nash equilibrium tax and subsidy rates (t , ) are given where both 
reactions functions intersect (Figure 1). 









  5Consider that the foreign trade bloc is a net-exporter, implementing an optimal tax policy 
( ). Equation (7) then suggests that the optimal tax rate for the foreign trade bloc is 
smaller the larger the price responsiveness of net exports (
0
* > w t
j h α α + ) in the home trade bloc. 
This is plausible, since policy changes in a small country have only a small influence on its 
terms of trade. Hence, if the home country competes on the world market with many small 
independent countries, the average foreign tax rate will tend to zero ( 0 = w t ). The home trade 
bloc will consequently operate as a monopoly and implement its optimum subsidy rate t  
(Figure 1). In practice, most agricultural markets can be characterized as an oligopoly, with a 
limited number of large trade blocs and numerous independent small countries. Hence, the 
average tax rate implemented in the rest of the world should be between zero and t . 
Consequently, the optimal response for the home trade bloc would be to fix a subsidy rate 










4.  Welfare effects of enlargement  
After the analysis of the equilibrium tax/subsidy rates, we will determine the conditions 
under which a member country of a trade bloc will benefit from enlargement. Since welfare 
effects will depend on the relative market power of the trading countries, we will first 
analyse the welfare effects for the monopoly case and later the welfare economics for a 
Nash-equilibrium of tax/subsidy rates (duopoly). The monopoly and duopoly scenarios lead 
to upper and lower bounds for the home country’s welfare effects.  
Let us first consider the monopoly case at which the home trade bloc implements its optimal 
tax/subsidy rate given by equation (6), whereas no tax/subsidy is implemented in the rest of 
the world. Consider further that the home trade bloc (country h+j) will be joined by a third 
  6country, implying that the price responsiveness of country j’s supply and demand will 
increase ( , ). Since the tax/subsidy rate will be introduced in the new member 
country, enlargement will influence the commodity price. An increase of the home trade 
bloc’s supply sector will also change its optimal tax/subsidy rate. Hence, the welfare effects 
due to enlargement can be written as the total differential of the home country’s welfare 
function: 

























































































=    (8) 
Making use of equations (1), (2), (6) and the assumption that the home country’s trade flow 
will not be affected by the enlargement ( ), equation (8) can be transformed into  0 = h X d
() ( ) ( )
j
hh j jh h
jh
h j h o
w h h X d
S X S X
dS
X X X






*,            ( 9 )  
where  ( ) 0 > + − − = w jh hd S D α ϖ  and    ( ) 0 > + = w h α α θ   
Equation (9) suggests that it is ambiguous whether the home country may gain or lose as a 
result of enlargement. The welfare effect of enlargement depends crucially on the trade flow 
and the size of individual countries. The first term of equation (9) indicates the strength by 
which the size of the new member country’s supply sector (dS ) influences the home 
country’s welfare. The second term characterizes how the trade flow of the joining member 
country (dX ) affects the welfare of the home country.  
0 > h j
j
The first term of equation (9) will be positive whenever the overall trade flow of the trade 
bloc shows into the same direction as that of the home country ( j h X X > ). This is plausible, 
because if the home country dominates the overall trade flow, the trade bloc’s optimal tax 
rate will influence the term of trade in the home country’s favor, as can be derived from 
  7equation (6). Enlargement will thereby push the world price even more towards the direction 
which is optimal for the home country.  
The trade bloc’s optimal tax rate will be also influenced in the home country’s favor if the 
trade flow of the joining country shows into the same direction as that of the home country 
(  or  ), while the trade flow of the home country has a different sign than 
that of the other member country ( j or  ). This implies a positive value for 
the second term of equation (9).  
0 , > h j X dX 0 , < h j X dX
h X X ≥ > 0 j h X X ≤ < 0
Next, we will analyze the welfare economics of enlargement for the duopoly case. We will 
investigate how a member country of a trade bloc will be affected if the latter is joined by a 
third member country. Taking the total differential of the home country’s welfare function, 









































































































W d      (10) 
We assume that the home country’s trade flow will not be affected by the enlargement 
( ). Based on and equations (1), (2) and (6), equation (10) can then be written as   0 = h X d
()
( ) ( )
() () ( ) ()
j
h hh j jh h
jh
j h j h hh h
j
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* *,          (11) 
where  ( ) 0 > + + − = h jh wd S D α µ    and  ( ) 0 > − = jh wd S S φ  
Equation (11) demonstrates that the welfare effects of enlargement based on the duopoly 
scenario can be larger or smaller than the welfare effects resulting from the monopoly case. 
The first and third term of equation (11) indicate the strength by which the size of the new 
member country’s supply sector (dS ) influences the home country’s welfare. Both terms  0 > h j
  8will be positive whenever the overall trade flow of the trade bloc shows into the same 
direction as that of the home country ( j h X X > ). Similar to the monopoly case, the trade 
bloc’s optimal tax rate will influence the term of trade in the home country’s favor, if the 
home country dominates the overall trade flow. Note that the first term of equation (11) has 
the same functional form as the first term of equation (9). We conclude that if the joining 
country has no effect on the overall trade flow of the trade bloc (dX ), a country 
benefiting from enlargement in the monopoly case will also benefit in the duopoly scenario 
and vice versa.  
0 = j
Let us now investigate the influence of the trade flow of the joining member country (dX ) 
on the welfare of the home country. The influence of the new country’s trade flow on the 
home country’s welfare is given by the second and fourth term of equation (11). The 
conditions that the second term of equation (11) takes a positive value are the same that were 
given for the second term of equation (9), since both terms have the same functional form. 
However, note that the fourth term of equation (11) may have a different sign than the 
second term. The rationale is that while the joining country may influence the home trade 
bloc’s optimal tax rate in the home country’s favor, it may adversely affect the foreign trade 
bloc’s optimal tax/subsidy policy. We conclude that the direction of welfare effects will be 
the same for the duopoly and monopoly scenario, if the size of the joining country is 
relatively large, while its net trade flow is small. For the opposite scenario of a small entrant 
with a large net trade flow, member country’s welfare effects based on the duopoly and 
monopoly scenario may show into different directions. 
j
 
  95. Numerical  analysis   
Based on the theoretical analysis of the previous sections, we will estimate the scale of 
welfare effects resulting from EU enlargement. The numerical analysis of welfare effects 
will be undertaken for the markets of wheat, maize, barley and rye, as the major European 
grain crops. Three enlargement scenarios were considered. As the first enlargement round 
we modeled the impact of the inclusion of the 10 Central and Eastern European countries in 
2005 on the welfare of the 15 ‘old’ EU member countries. Since grain production in most of 
the entry countries was very small in comparison to EU production, we considered only 
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as the major entrants. The second 
enlargement was based on the assumption that Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia would join the 
EU. The inclusion of Turkey was expected to occur in a third enlargement round. All 
calculations were based on an average supply elasticity of 0.5 and a demand elasticity of -
0.4.  
The results presented in Table 1 demonstrate that the direction of national welfare effects 
depends crucially on the net trade flow of the joining and existing member country as well as 
on whether a monopoly or a duopoly is considered. In the absence of any policy 
intervention, the combined net export of those countries joining during the first and second 
enlargement would be positive, whereas Turkey would become a net-importer.  
Based on the monopoly scenario, the net-exporting countries Denmark, France and Germany 
would be better off as a result of the first and second enlargement. This is plausible since the 
overall trade flow of the EU will be dominated by exporting member countries. Since the 
joining countries are also net-exporters, the EU tax rate will be influenced in favor of net-
exporters. The reverse reasoning may explain that the same countries will be worse off if the 
net-importer Turkey joined the EU. It also explains that net-importing countries would be 
  10worse off after the first two enlargement rounds, but gain from the inclusion of Turkey. The 
results thereby indicate that the welfare effect induced by an increase of the domestic supply 
sector (first term of equation 9) is smaller than the welfare effect induced by the joining 
country’s influence on the net trade flow of the EU (second term of equation 9). This may 
also explain that most countries being better (worse) off due to enlargement if the EU 
operated as a monopoly would lose (gain) if the EU had to compete with the rest of the 
world within a duopoly.  
The results suggest further that the scale of welfare effects is positively related to the size of 
a member country’s supply sector and the quantity of its net trade flow. However, welfare 
effects are generally low, if the welfare estimates of Table 1 are compared to the total 
production value. Even the largest welfare gain (€ 10.9 millions) which could be realized by 
France, if the EU competed with the rest of the world within a duopoly, represents only less 
than 0.2% of the value of French grain production. A sensitivity analysis shows that the 
share would not significantly increase if different values for the price elasticity of demand 
and supply were considered. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The study was motivated by the question of whether welfare gains might provide an 
argument for the enlargement of trading blocs, once trade is liberalized. In this context, it 
was demonstrated that it is not guaranteed that all member countries will gain from the 
enlargement of a trade bloc, since welfare effects depend crucially on a member country’s 
trade flow in relation to that of other member countries. The direction of welfare effects 
depends also on the relative market power of the trade bloc in comparison to that of foreign 
competitors.  
  11While other studies estimated welfare effects from EU enlargement based on the status quo 
of existing trade barriers, the approach chosen in this paper was to analyze welfare effects 
based on a hypothetical scenario. It was assumed that tariffs were abolished, while countries 
were allowed to use a production tax/subsidy as a substitute. This scenario may represent the 
final stage of the WTO process, at which tariffs will be eliminated, whereas domestic 
support measures such as environmental, health or safety regulations, might be used as a 
substitute.  
Since the world grain market is dominated by a few large countries and trade blocs, the grain 
market structure may be best represented by an oligopoly rather than a monopoly or 
duopoly. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which Europe’s trading partners 
may act strategically in designing domestic policy. Based on the hypothetical scenario that 
the EU operates either as a monopoly or competes with the rest of the world within a 
duopoly, upper and lower bounds of potential welfare effects resulting from enlargement 
were estimated. The numerical analysis confirmed that some countries may gain from 
enlargement, if the EU could operate as a monopolist, but may lose under a duopoly scenario 
and vice versa.  
The numerical results suggest that welfare effects on the major European grain markets are 
very small in proportion to the total production value. When extrapolating this result to other 
markets, we conclude that economic reasons are unlikely to play an important role with 
regard to further enlargement decision. Although economic reasons might have provided 
some incentives for previous enlargement rounds given the level of trade distortions existing 
in the past, the economic reasons will lose importance as trade is further liberalized. Political 
reasons are likely to remain the driving force for further EU enlargement.  
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  15Table 1: National welfare effects on grain markets as a result of EU enlargement  
Welfare change
(1,000 Euro) Monopoly Duopoly Monopoly Duopoly Monopoly Duopoly
+ Denmark 39 -255 32 -169 -13 385
+ France 1.648 -7.176 1.510 -4.631 -1.172 10.902
+ Germany 198 -1.266 163 -841 -71 1.915
- Austria -23 34 -24 18 28 -53
- Belgium-Luxembourg -186 706 -176 449 151 -1.074
- Finland -12 22 -12 12 14 -34
- Greece -70 240 -68 151 62 -366
- Ireland -50 174 -48 110 44 -266
- Italy -425 1.516 -405 958 361 -2.310
- Netherlands -304 1.179 -286 752 242 -1.795
- Portugal -197 763 -185 486 157 -1.161
- Spain -468 1.650 -447 1.041 400 -2.516
+ Sweden 0 -51 -2 -36 8 76
+ United Kingdom  -14 -193 -25 -140 55 287
+ Czech Republic 82 -302 -55 702
+ Hungary 318 -1.011 -241 2.374
+ Slovakia 22 -95 -13 219
- Poland -187 320 186 -802
+ Bulgaria -108 1.090
+ Croatia -40 444
+ Romania 23 414
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